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Abstract This paper assesses the evolution of regional disparities in China, and brings information and
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protection, and governance reform. Specific policies within this broad strategy are then discussed in light
of international experience. We also propose that the Chinese government take an experimental approach
to interventions, as it did in the early period of agricultural reforms, learning lessons from the outcomes
before scaling up.
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.. Introduction
ince the start of reforms in 1978, spectacular economic growth and
overty reduction in China have been accompanied by sharp rises in
nequality and increasingly frequent manifestations of social tension
hrough unrest of various types. In response to these rising inequali-
ies, in 2005 the Chinese government adopted an explicit objective of
harmonious development.” A key dimension of harmonious devel-
pment is balanced development across regions. Many strategies
nd investment plans have been developed to stimulate growth and
mprovement of living standards of residents in rural areas and in
ess developed Western China.
This paper reviews the evolution of regional disparities in China,
nd brings information and trends up to date with the latest data
vailable (Section 2). It relates the evolution of spatial inequality
ver the years to the policy stances taken by the Chinese authori-
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.ies during different phases since 1949. Based on this assessment,
t then presents the broad outline of a strategy to harmonize growth
nd regional equity. We consider three elements of this strategy,
nder the heading of three categories of policy instruments: infras-
ructure, social investment and protection, and governance reform.
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pecific policies within this broad strategy are then discussed in
ight of international experience (Section 3). We also propose that
he Chinese government take an experimental approach to these
nterventions, as it did in the early period of agricultural reforms,
y trying out different interventions and learning lessons from their
utcomes before scaling up (Section 4).
. Evolution of regional disparities and policy
.1. Regional disparities in China
egional disparities are a feature of the world, particularly of low
nd middle income countries. As Kanbur and Venables (2007) doc-
ment, within country disparities are high and have been growing
n the past quarter century. China is no exception to this global pat-
ern. As shown in Table 1, in 2007, per capita GDP in the inland
egions averaged 13,513 Yuan, or less than half of that in the coastal
egions.2 At the provincial level, the difference is even larger. Per
apita GDP in Shanghai is 10 times as large as in Guizhou. If mea-
ured by per capita income, rural and urban residents in the inland
egions earned only about two-thirds of their counterparts in the
oastal regions. The rural–urban gap in per capita income is also
normous: 3 times in the coastal regions and 3.2 times in the inland
egions.
Social indicators follow a similar pattern. The infant mortality
ate (IMR) in the coast in 2005 was only 9 per 1000 live births,
bout half the level in the inland (18.8 per 1000 live births). In both
oastal and inland areas, rural IMR was about twice of the urban
MR. Regarding literacy rate in 2005, coastal and urban areas also
erformed much better than inland and rural areas, respectively. For
ll three indicators, the rural–urban gap is wider in inland regions
han in coastal regions.
How have regional disparities in their different dimensions
volved since the revolution? Table 2 lists major economic indicators
or China from 1952 to 2008. Table 3 presents inequality mea-
ures and Fig. 1 graphs the evolution of China’s regional inequality,
s measured by the Gini and generalized entropy (GE) indices.3
he two indices move in close relation to each other, matching the
ifferent phases of Chinese development remarkably well.
Over the past fifty years inequality has peaked three
imes—during the Great Famine, at the end of the Cultural Revolu-
ion, and in the current period of global integration. Similarly, there
re three major troughs in the overall evolution of inequality—in
952, right at the beginning of the data series; in 1967, at the end
f the recovery from the Great Famine and before the effects of the
ultural Revolution set in; and in 1984, at the end of the rural reform
eriod and the start of the expansion based on global integration.
verall, inequality seems to have been low when policy was encour-ging to agriculture and the rural sector generally, and high when
his sector was relatively neglected.
These patterns of income inequality can be disaggregated by
ecomposing overall inequality into sub-components and exam-
2 The coastal region includes Beijing, Liaoning, Tianjin, Hebei, Shan-
ong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong and Guangxi. All
he remaining provinces are classified as inland.
3 The figures may be slightly different from those presented in Kanbur
nd Zhang (2005) for two reasons. In this paper, we use 1978 as a base year
hen calculating real per capita consumption instead of 1952 as used in
he Kanbur and Zhang paper. Second, we include Hainan and Chongqing as
eparate observations after they were upgraded into provincial status.
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ning the evolution of these components. Because each year, we
ave observations at the provincial level with a rural–urban divide,
he GE index can be decomposed into a “within rural–urban” and
“between rural and urban” component (we will call the lat-
er rural–urban inequality). The overall GE and the between rural
nd urban component are shown in Table 3 and plotted separately
n Figs. 1 and 2. Another key dimension of inequality in China,
specially in the post-reform period, is that between inland and
oastal provinces (Chen and Fleisher, 1996; and Zhang and Kanbur,
001). The “between inland and coastal” component (we will call
t inland–coastal inequality thereafter) is reported in Table 3 and
raphed in Fig. 3. It is apparent that while the rural–urban gap
ccounts for a large share of overall inequality in the whole period,
t is the inland–coastal disparity which has grown rapidly since the
ate 1970s when China started its economic reform.
For the evolution of inequality in non-income indicators, we
ainly look at illiteracy rate and IMR. Table 4 presents the levels of
hese two indicators in 1981, 1990, 2000, and 2005, when population
ensus and survey data are available. Both indicators have improved
ver this period. Similar to economic indicators, the rural–urban
nd coastal–inland gaps in social indicators are enormous. In 2005,
oth illiteracy rate and IMR in rural areas are more than twice of
hose in cities. The IMR in inland regions are as high as 18.8 per
000 live births, more than twice of the level in coastal regions.
able 5 lists regional inequality in these two indicators. Both Gini
nd Theil indexes show that social inequality has increased steadily
rom 1981 to 2005. Overall, the regional pattern of social inequality
losely mirrors that of income inequality.
The data in 1981, 1990 and 2000 are from the China Population
ensus in the corresponding years. The data in 2005 are obtained
rom 1% Population Survey (China National Bureau of Statistics,
ee http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/renkou/2005/renkou.htm).
he 1981 census defines the illiteracy rate using age 12 as a
enchmark, while the 1990 and 2000 censuses and the 2005 1%
opulation survey refer to the people 15 years old and above.
herefore, they may not be totally comparable.
.2. Policies and outcomes
he evolution of regional inequalities in China since the revolution
as been influenced by the policy stances taken by the authorities.
able 2 shows the evolution of three economic policy variables – the
hare of heavy industry in gross value of total output (a measure of
he bias against agriculture and China’s comparative advantage), the
atio of trade volume to total GDP, and effective tariff rate (a mea-
ure of the degree of openness), and the ratio of local government
xpenditure to total government expenditure (a measure of fiscal
ecentralization). We argue below that there is a close association
etween these policies and regional disparities.4
In the 1950s, influenced by the experience and ideology of the
oviet Union and threatened by trade embargos, China placed the
evelopment of heavy industry as the top priority. To finance the
apital-intensive heavy industry sector, the government had to sup-
ress agricultural product prices so as to extract as much resources as
4 In Kanbur and Zhang (2005), an econometric analysis was conducted to
stablish the relationship between economic policies and observed regional
nequality patterns up to 2000. The statistical analysis confirms the narrative
ccount given in this section. Because the variables used in calculating the
eavy industry development strategy is no longer published since 2000, in
his paper, we could not update the regression to 2007.
China’s
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Table 1 Regional economic development.
Province GDP Per capita GDP or income in 2007 (yuan) IMR (number of deaths per 1000 live births) Illiteracy rate (%)
Urban income Rural income Urban/Rural Overall Urban Rural Rural/Urban Overall Urban Rural Rural/Urban
Beijing 57431 24725 10662 2.3 0.8 0.0 4.5 n.a. 3.9 3.7 8.7 2.4
Tianjin 47972 19423 7911 2.5 2.3 1.7 3.4 2.0 4.8 4.5 8.2 1.8
Hebei 19363 13341 4796 2.8 8.4 4.4 10.0 2.3 7.2 4.6 8.7 1.9
Shanxi 16143 13119 4097 3.2 11.9 10.7 12.6 1.2 5.6 3.6 7.2 2.0
Inner Mongolia 25558 14433 4656 3.1 13.7 8.8 19.3 2.2 11.3 7.0 17.5 2.5
Liaoning 24645 14393 5577 2.6 5.0 4.8 5.3 1.1 4.8 3.7 7.1 1.9
Jilin 17211 12830 4933 2.6 5.7 7.6 4.4 0.6 5.9 4.3 8.0 1.9
Heilongjiang 18463 11581 4856 2.4 4.4 2.6 5.7 2.2 6.2 4.8 8.2 1.7
Shanghai 65473 26675 11440 2.3 2.8 3.2 0.0 0.0 5.2 5.8 13.0 2.2
Jiangsu 32985 18680 7357 2.5 11.1 12.5 9.3 0.7 10.0 7.4 14.1 1.9
Zhejiang 35730 22727 9258 2.5 9.3 5.2 14.6 2.8 12.0 8.5 16.9 2.0
Anhui 11180 12990 4203 3.1 18.2 14.2 20.3 1.4 19.2 11.8 24.1 2.0
Fujian 23663 17962 6196 2.9 10.5 6.4 14.4 2.2 12.9 8.5 18.3 2.1
Jiangxi 12204 12866 4697 2.7 17.8 9.4 22.8 2.4 10.5 5.8 13.5 2.4
Shandong 27148 16305 5641 2.9 8.5 7.0 9.8 1.4 12.4 8.8 16.0 1.8
Henan 15056 13231 4454 3.0 7.9 3.0 10.0 3.3 9.8 5.9 11.9 2.0
Hubei 14733 13153 4656 2.8 9.3 6.5 11.4 1.8 12.1 7.8 16.0 2.1
Hunan 13123 13821 4513 3.1 12.9 9.2 14.9 1.6 8.6 4.1 11.3 2.7
Guangdong 32142 19733 6400 3.1 11.3 7.2 17.9 2.5 6.0 4.4 9.8 2.2
Guangxi 11417 14146 3690 3.8 15.2 7.3 18.8 2.6 8.6 4.4 10.9 2.5
Hainan 13361 12608 4390 2.9 11.7 6.3 16.6 2.7 9.8 7.0 13.6 1.9
Chongqing 14011 14368 4126 3.5 9.8 12.3 7.9 0.6 11.7 6.5 16.6 2.5
Sichuan 11708 12633 4121 3.1 14.4 10.1 16.2 1.6 16.6 7.8 21.0 2.7
Guizhou 6742 11759 2797 4.2 52.3 25.4 61.4 2.4 21.4 9.6 26.1 2.7
Yunnan 9459 13250 3103 4.3 36.9 22.3 43.3 1.9 20.1 12.4 24.0 1.9
Tibet 11567 12482 3176 3.9 68.8 48.8 72.6 1.5 44.8 37.3 47.9 1.3
Shaanxi 12843 12858 3137 4.1 16.0 11.8 18.7 1.6 10.3 6.6 13.5 2.1
Gansu 9527 10969 2724 4.0 37.6 16.2 45.5 2.8 20.8 9.6 26.0 2.7
Qinghai 12809 11640 3061 3.8 43.1 8.5 57.2 6.7 24.1 10.1 33.7 3.4
Ningxia 12695 12932 3681 3.5 25.9 21.6 27.8 1.3 18.7 8.9 26.9 3.0
Xinjiang 16164 11432 3503 3.3 24.2 11.2 29.3 2.6 8.3 6.1 9.9 1.6
National average 22698 15781 4761 3.3 15.0 8.8 19.2 2.2 11.0 6.3 15.2 2.4
Coast 29183 18430 6046 3.0 9.0 6.7 11.5 1.7 8.8 5.7 12.8 2.2
Inland 13513 12932 4055 3.2 18.8 10.9 22.9 2.1 12.6 6.8 16.4 2.4
Note: Per capita GDP and income in current prices in 2007 are from China Statistical Yearbook (China National Statistical Bureau, 2008). The infant mortality rate (IMR) and illiteracy rate in 2005 are obtained
from 1% Population Survey (China National Bureau of Statistics, see http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/renkou/2005/renkou.htm). The coastal and inland averages are calculated by authors.
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Table 2 China: economic indicators, 1952–2008.
Year GDP (Billion) Total expenditure (Billion) Tariff rate (%) Trade ratio (%) Decentralization (%) HID (%)
1952 67.9 17.2 12.8 9.5 25.9 15.3
1955 91.0 26.3 7.6 12.1 23.5 19.7
1960 145.7 64.4 9.2 8.8 56.7 52.1
1965 171.6 46.0 10.3 6.9 38.2 30.4
1970 225.3 64.9 12.5 5.0 41.1 36.4
1975 299.7 82.1 10.2 9.7 50.1 40.2
1980 454.6 122.9 11.2 12.5 45.7 38.5
1985 901.6 200.4 16.3 22.9 60.3 38.6
1990 1866.8 308.4 6.2 29.8 67.4 38.3
1995 6079.4 682.4 2.6 38.7 70.8 33.1
2000 9921.5 1588.7 4.0 39.6 65.3 n.a.
2005 18321.7 3393.0 2.0 63.8 74.1 n.a.
2008 30067.0 6242.7 2.0 65.3 78.6 n.a.
Note: The data are from Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (China National Bureau of Statistics, 2000) and various
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HID stand for gross output value and the percentage of gross output val
strategy). Since 1999, China has stopped publishing gross output value fig
ossible. To ensure a stable labor supply in the agricultural sector, the
overnment imposed the household registration system (Hukou) to
onfine people to work in their birth places. Meanwhile, the rationing
ystem enabled urban residents to have access to food, housing, edu-
ation, and guaranteed jobs in the state or collectively owned firms.
he heavy industry-led development strategy climaxed at the Great
eap Forward, which eventually led to the disastrous Great Famine
n 1959–1961. As attested in Fig. 2, the rural–urban gap peaked at
he Great Famine period and in the end of the Cultural Revolution
1966–1976).
The strategy led to nearly three decades of stagnation in per capita
ncome. For fear of renewed famine due to the dismal performance
f agricultural production under the collective farming system, in
he late 1970s the central government shifted its development strate-
ies toward more labor intensive sectors, initially agriculture, and
hen increasingly export-oriented rural industries. The rural reform
Table 3 Regional inequality and decomposition: 1952–2007.
Year Gini Theil Rural–urban Inland–coast
1952 25.9 12.7 8.3 0.4
1955 23.5 10.1 6.6 0.2
1960 32.6 17.9 13.7 0.4
1965 28.2 14.0 11.1 0.1
1970 28.4 14.7 11.9 0.1
1975 29.0 15.9 13.6 0.3
1980 26.8 13.6 11.6 0.4
1985 23.3 9.6 7.2 0.6
1990 27.0 13.0 8.4 0.9
1995 30.7 16.2 10.4 1.3
2000 33.3 19.4 11.8 2.1
2005 35.0 22.0 13.7 3.0
2007 34.1 19.4 12.0 3.3
Note: The regional inequality measures are the Gini coefficient and Theil
measure (GE index with c = 1), calculated by authors based on popu-
lation weighted real per capita consumption at the provincial level in
rural and urban areas. The data are from Comprehensive Statistical Data
and Materials on 50 Years of New China (China National Bureau of
Statistics, 2000) and various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook
(China National Bureau of Statistics, various issues). Rural–urban and
inland–coastal inequalities are defined as the between rural and urban
and between inland and coastal components of the GE index.
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orious issues). GDP and total expenditures are in current prices. GOV and
heavy industry in total GOV (a measure of heavy industry development
ranted farmers the user right to cultivate their land and make their
roduction decisions. The reform greatly stimulated farmers’ pro-
uction incentives and boosted their income. Consequently, both the
ural–urban gap and overall inequality witnessed a sharp decline in
his rural reform period as shown in Figs. 1 and 2.
Because of the dramatic increase in labor productivity under the
ural reform, surplus labor developed in agriculture. In addition,
ising income from rural residents drove up the demand for many
anufactured goods. This created a good opportunity to develop
abor-intensive town–village enterprises (TVEs). Not surprisingly,
VEs’ share of gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 14.3%
n 1980 to 37.5% in 1995 (Xu and Zhang, 2009). It is no exagger-
tion that the TVE was the major engine of China’s growth and
ndustrialization in the early stages of China’s reforms and helped
arrow the rural–urban gap.
Since the 1980s, openness has become a key development strat-
gy. With openness to the outside world, the comparative advantage
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igure 1 Regional inequality in per capita consumption.
ote: The regional inequality measures are the Gini coefficient and Theil
ndex (with c = 1), calculated by authors based on population weighted
eal per capita consumption at the provincial level in rural and urban
reas. The data are from Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials
n 50 Years of New China (China National Bureau of Statistics, 2000)
nd various issues of China Statistical Yearbook (China National Bureau
f Statistics, various issues).
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Figure 2 Heavy industry development strategy and rural–urban
divides.
Note: The left vertical axis stands for heavy industry development strat-
egy (HID), while the right one represents rural–urban disparity. The data
are from Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years
of New China (China National Bureau of Statistics, 2000) and vari-
ous issues of China Statistical Yearbook (China National Bureau of
Statistics, various issues).
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Figure 3 Openness and inland–coastal disparity.
Note: The left vertical axis stands for trade ratio, while the right one
represents inland–coastal disparity. The data are from Comprehensive
Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (China National
Bureau of Statistics, 2000) and various issues of China Statistical Year-
book (China National Bureau of Statistics, various issues).
Table 5 Regional inequality in illiteracy rate and infant mortality
rate.
Year Gini Theil Rural–urban Inland–coast Female–male
Illiteracy rate
1981 30.3 14.5 17.8 0.2 59.0
1990 33.5 18.1 26.0 2.4 51.4
2000 36.3 21.4 25.8 1.1 44.6
2005 41.8 28.4 29.7 5.0 39.7
IMR
1981 27.0 11.9 11.1 31.6 0.3
1990 29.6 14.1 16.7 38.1 1.6
2000 36.7 22.5 35.9 20.6 5.1
2005 40.0 28.4 18.5 18.2 2.8
Note: See Table 2 for data sources. The GE measure is parameterized
so as to make it the Theil measure of inequality. National inequality in
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Table 4 Illiteracy rate and infant mortality rate.
Year National Rural Urban Ru
Total F M Total F M
Illiteracy rate
1981 31.9 34.8 49.1 21.1 16.4 24.6 8.9 2.1
1990 22.2 26.2 37.1 15.7 12.0 18.4 6.1 2.2
2000 15.2 18.7 26.5 11.2 8.7 13.1 4.1 2.2
2005 11.0 15.2 21.8 8.5 6.3 9.7 2.8 2.4
IMR
1981 36.6 39.1 38.1 40.0 23.6 22.4 24.8 1.7
1990 30.5 32.4 34.9 30.0 19.1 19.5 18.8 1.7
2000 24.1 30.8 36.7 25.8 11.0 13.5 10.3 2.8
2005 15.0 19.2 22.2 16.7 8.9 9.1 8.6 2.2
Note: F, female; M, male.illiteracy rate and infant mortality rate are calculated using population at
the provincial level with a rural–urban and gender divide. Rural–urban,
inland–coastal, and female–male polarization indexes are defined as the
ratio of between-group GE to total GE.
or the coastal regions began to reshape. The coastal regions ben-
fited disproportionately from this openness due to their proximity
o the international market and more developed economies, par-
icularly Hong Kong and Taiwan. From 1999 to 2005, the central
overnment’s capital investment in the coastal region was 4696.7
illion Yuan (52.94%) to the central region’s 2255.1 billion Yuan
25.42%) and the western region’s 1920.4 billion Yuan (21.65%)
Yao, 2009). In less than two decades, China became the largest
ecipient of foreign direct investment among developing countries
rom a virtually closed economy in the late 1970s. As a result, the
oastal regions experienced much more rapid growth, widening the
oastal–inland gap in the reform period since the late 1970s (Fig. 3).
n terms of trends, coastal–inland inequality showed a steep climb
uring this period.
After opening to trade, the central government also underwent a
ignificant transition from a planned economy to a market economy,
hich was highlighted by several key market reforms. The success
f rural reform in the early 1980s released a tremendous number
f labor from agricultural production. The government introduced
arious policies to ease labor migration (Cai, 2010). First, during
he initial stage of the rural reform, farmers were allowed to work
n nonagricultural sectors even without migration. Second, more
mportantly, the hukou system was greatly loosened, enabling
orkers to migrate towards regions with more job opportunities,
ral/Urban Inland Coast Inland/Coast F M F/M
33.7 29.1 1.2 45.3 19.2 2.4
23.8 19.6 1.2 31.9 13.0 2.5
16.0 13.9 1.2 21.8 8.7 2.5
12.6 8.8 1.4 16.1 5.9 2.8
44.5 24.4 1.8 35.7 37.6 1.0
35.8 17.2 2.1 30.6 26.8 1.1
26.8 13.6 2.0 28.4 20.5 1.4
18.8 9.0 2.1 16.9 13.5 1.2
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Figure 4 Decentralization and overall inequality (Gini coefficient).
Note: The left vertical axis stands for the degree of decentralization,
while the right one represents the Gini coefficient. The data are from
Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New
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.e. the coastal regions. Both policy change and structural trans-
ormations have generated one of the most dramatic migration
ynamics in human history. In 1983, the number of rural migrants
umbered only two million. By 2006, it reached over 132 million
Cai, 2010). The young and more educated are more likely to
ork off the farm (Maurer-Fazio, 1999 and de Brauw et al., 2002),
hereby increasing returns to education investment.
Despite the massive migration, compared to developed countries,
he share of population working in the agricultural sector is still
igh. But this suggests opportunities for institutional reforms to
urther improve labor market integration. Zhang and Tan (2007)
stimate that reallocating even 1% of the agricultural labor force
ould increase national GDP by 0.9%.
Prices and quantities of inputs and outputs were rigidly con-
rolled by the state before the reform. These controls were gradually
elaxed over time. By the mid-1990s, prices and quantities of most
roducts were determined by the market. Furthermore, the National
eople’s Congress passed the “Law on Unjust Competition” in 1993,
nd in 2001 the State Council issued order 303 “Stipulation of
he State Council to Forbid Regional Blockade in Market Activi-
ies.” In addition, the government has made massive investments in
ighway and railway construction in the past two decades to lower
ransportation costs across regions (Huang and Luo, 2009). Con-
rary to expectations, however, urban versus rural regional inequality
emained high, while the inland–coastal disparity has been increas-
ng until 2007, the point up to which the latest data are available.
One plausible explanation for the fact that disparities increased
n the wake of market development is that the capital market may
ave become more fragmented over time. Boyreau-Debray and Wei
2005) and Zhang and Tan (2007) found that the gap in the marginal
roduct of capital across sectors and regions grew during the reform
eriod. Poncet et al. (2008) discovered that Chinese firms follow
“political-pecking order” in attaining formal credit. The large
nefficiency in capital allocation across sectors and regions also
mplies opportunities. According to the estimates of Zhang and
an (2007), reallocating 1% of capital from urban to rural areas
hile holding total capital constant would lead to a 0.5% gain in
ational GDP.
To provide greater incentives for local governments to develop
heir local economies, the central government initiated fiscal reform
y linking local expenditures more tightly to local revenues. Fiscal
ecentralization greatly enhanced inter-county competition and pro-
oted economic growth (Cheung, 2008; Qian and Roland, 1998).
owever, with China’s hierarchical governance structure, a region’s
overnment size is proportional to the number of registered inhab-
tants regardless of its local economic size. The responsibility of
nancing local public goods services, such as education, healthcare
nd government employee salaries, is the same across regions. Large
egional variation in economic development levels means that the
ffective tax burden differs greatly across regions. The implicit high
ax burden in poorer regions thwarts potential investment despite the
act that the marginal product of capital may be higher there. The
nteraction between the decentralized fiscal system and the cen-
ralized governance structure may lead to the observed pattern of
capital flying from poor inland regions to the rich coastal regions”
Zhang, 2006).
Overall, fiscal centralization gave the central government more
iscretionary power for regional redistribution, while decentraliza-
ion provided more incentives for local governments to develop
heir economy at some cost of redistribution. As indicated in Fig. 4,
he pattern of overall regional inequality largely coincides with the
egree of decentralization in the past six decades.
i
i
y
ghina (China National Bureau of Statistics, 2000) and various issues of
hina Statistical Yearbook (China National Bureau of Statistics, various
ssues).
In congruence with the regional inequality in income and
onsumption presented here, social and welfare indicators have
xhibited a similar pattern of disparity. Under central planning, the
entral government promoted universal basic education and called
or each community to establish its own clinics for preventive health-
are. As a result, both education and health indicators improved
ramatically in the period. As the collectives were dissolved in
he late 1970s, so was the rural healthcare system. Under fiscal
ecentralization, however, funding for social programs (along with
evenue generation) was delegated to the sub-national level. As a
esult, local governments were required to finance their own social
rograms. The per capita expenditure for subnational governments
n education and healthcare in the coastal regions has been 1.5 times
igher than those of the inland regions (Huang and Luo, 2009).
any local governments, particularly in the inland and rural areas,
ere forced to charge higher fees for basic and higher education
o offset the shortfall of local revenues. Although the overall illit-
racy and infant mortality rates have improved as a result of rapid
ncome growth in the reform period as shown in Table 4, the regional
istribution of these indicators has worsened as indicated in Table 5.
In large part as a response to the Asian Financial Crisis in the
ate 1990s, the central government initiated a “western develop-
ent strategy (Go West)” to combat worsening regional inequality.
etween 2000 and 2005, the central government started 70 main
onstruction projects and the total amount of investment in the
estern regions reached one trillion Yuan (Yao, 2009). More than
ne third of the funds raised by long-term government bonds for
onstruction were directed to the western regions during this time
eriod, and from 2002 to 2005 the percent of funds from these bonds
irected to the region reached 40% (Yao, 2009). From 2000 to 2005,
he new roads built in the western region reached 220,000 km, with
853 km of highways (Yao, 2009). By 2005, the central government
nvested 460 billion Yuan in construction projects in the western
reas. Fiscal transfers and subsidies of 500 billion Yuan were also
nvested in the western areas (Chen and Lu, 2009).
Moreover, since January of 2006, the government has fully abol-
shed agricultural taxation, for the first time in over two thousand
ears of Chinese history. The government also provided subsidies to
rain producers to boost agricultural production and farmer income.
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Furthermore, the government has gradually waived various fees for
basic education in rural areas and in the past several years, a new rural
collective medical scheme has been introduced. Khan and Riskin
(2005) are one of the first to argue that income inequality had begun
to level off using a large-scale household survey in 2002 and iden-
tified the western development strategy as the key explanation. It is
interesting to note that regional inequality and the rural–urban gap
based on aggregate per capita consumption at the provincial level in
our calculation has also nosed down since 2005 (Table 3 and Fig. 1).
Based on primary survey data in two poorest provinces, Guizhou and
Gansu, Zhang, Yang, and Wang (2009) show that real wages have
risen rapidly since 2003 in contrast to the stagnation of wage lev-
els in the early period of 1995–2002, indicating an improvement in
rural income.
3. Policies to address regional disparities
Going forward, the government has expressed a clear objective of
“harmonious development,” which includes addressing regional dis-
parities. On the basis of the historical experience in China, as well
as international experience, we now consider a number of policy
instruments to achieve greater regional equity, under the headings
of: (i) infrastructure investment and clustering, (ii) social protection
investment, and (iii) governance reform.
3.1. Infrastructure investment and clustering
Recent studies on China have shown that investment in public infras-
tructure can be both an explanation for regional inequality and,
therefore, part of a strategy for containing rising regional inequality.
Ravallion (2005) establishes that there are indeed spatial agglomera-
tion forces at play in explaining changes in individual level incomes,
and the crucial role of local infrastructure (as well as local natural
endowments) in explaining successful income growth.
Using the agricultural census data in 1998, Fan and Zhang (2004)
show that rural infrastructure and education play an important role in
explaining the large spatial difference in rural nonfarm productivity.
Using detailed road data by type, Fan and Chan-Kang (2008) further
confirm that investment in rural roads even have higher returns than
investment in highways.
Fan et al. (2004) develop a comprehensive analysis of the role
of different types of government expenditure on rural growth and
poverty. Using a wide range of provincial data over a period of
a quarter century, it builds and estimates a simultaneous equa-
tions econometric model to calculate economic returns, poverty
reduction, and impact on regional inequality of different cate-
gories of public expenditure. It is shown that productivity is
enhanced and poverty is reduced by increased expenditures for
research and development, irrigation, education, roads, electricity,
and telecommunications. The policy implications of this analysis
are direct and strong. If the government wishes to manage growing
regional inequality in China, then investing in public infrastruc-
ture in the lagging regions will have to be an important policy
priority.
In the past several years under the western development strategy
and the new socialism countryside movement, the government has
made significant strides in investing in infrastructure, particularly
through improvements of roads and railways in lagging regions. As
shown in Fig. 1, overall regional inequality has leveled off and even
slightly declined since the mid 2000s, a few years after the west-
ern development strategy took place. This provides some tentative
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vidence that the western development strategy may have played a
ole.
The demand for labor is also overtaking supply, creating a labor
hortage in the past several years (The Economist, 2008; Zhang et
l., 2009). There is an increasing pressure for firms to outsource
roduction or relocate their business to the inland regions to access
ore abundant land and cheaper labor. The improvement in road
etworks enables many previously inaccessible interior regions to
eceive outsourcing orders from coastal production centers.
The rapid industrialization of the coastal regions is largely due
o a successful cluster-based production model. A basic feature of
luster-based rural industrialization in the coastal region is the deep
nvolvement of local governments, particularly township govern-
ents. At the initial stage when private ownership was officially
ecognized by the Chinese constitution, local governments provided
e facto protection of private property rights (Xu and Zhang, 2009).
ater on, township governments took strategic responsibilities for
he overall development of industrial clusters. Therefore, it is also
mportant to nurture cluster development in lagging regions. Some
f the successful clustering experiences in the coastal regions may
e relevant to the interior regions.
Thus, in broad strategic terms, China’s strategy on infrastruc-
ure build up in the lagging regions is not very different to that in
ther countries. Chinese authorities have responded to the growing
egional gaps by increasing infrastructure investment in the lagging
egions. There is sufficient experience in China to learn from on this
ront. Research shows that the returns to infrastructure investment in
agging regions are in general high. However, there are two specific
ssues on which more detailed research is needed: (i) further analysis
n what specific types of infrastructure have the highest returns in
hich specific regions, and (ii) the problem of very remote regions.
n these regions, the marginal returns to infrastructure investment
ay decrease quickly as it can become extremely costly to build
oads and other types of infrastructure—for these regions, a more
easible option may be to move people out of the fragile lands into
reas with more jobs.
.2. Social protection investment
espite spectacular poverty reduction, perhaps the most impressive
ecord of poverty reduction in history, poverty remains a major prob-
em in China, with several hundred million people in poverty. Social
rotection investment is thus a key area of debate in China. In this
ection, we will address these concerns through the lens of regional
isparity—arguing that social protection programs are particularly
mportant in the lagging regions of rural areas and inland provinces.
Our analysis of the evolution of Chinese regional inequality has
hown the importance of migration in mitigating these inequalities.
hinese authorities should systematically address impediments to
igration, but sometimes social protection instruments can unwit-
ingly become such impediments. For example, in the past several
ears, the government has mandated workers to participate in social
ecurity. One key challenge is that the social security benefits are not
ortable across provinces. Connecting the social security systems
cross provinces and making the benefits portable would greatly
acilitate migration, and remains an important plan in a regionally
riented social protection strategy.After several decades of negligence of social protection invest-
ents in lagging regions, China has made tremendous progress in
eversing the trend in the past several years. First experimented with
n the middle of the 1990s, the minimum support program was for-
ally scaled up nationwide in 2007. By 2008, 42.8 million rural
54 S. Fan et al.
Table 6 Progress in establishing rural social security.
2006 2008
Extreme poverty line (yuan) 683 785
Total number of people below the line (million) 23.65 21.48
Total central spending on minimum support (hundred million) 42 94
No. of people covered (million) 15.09 42.84
Average amount per capita (yuan) 276 218
Minimum support transfer as a percentage of poverty line 40 28
CMS enrollment rate (%) 79 92
Per capita total contribution (yuan) 50 100
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Note: Compiled by authors based on official documents p
04/22/content 17653543.htm).
esidents have been covered by the program (Table 6). However, the
verage amount per capita is still rather low at 218 Yuan, about 28%
f the official extreme poverty line (785 Yuan).
Another major achievement is the establishment of the new rural
ollective medical service network (CMS). The aim is to ensure
hat rural residents have easy access to primary health care services.
n 2003, China began to experiment with the new rural collective
edical service network. Within just five years, 815 million rural
esidents, 91.5% of the total rural population, have enrolled in the
etwork. The contribution is shared by various levels of government
80%) and individuals (20%). It has doubled from 50 Yuan in 2006 to
00 Yuan in 2008. The government has committed to significantly
ncrease its contribution in the next few years. Since catastrophic
llness is one of the most important forces driving a household into
overty, the effort of establishing a basic health insurance is greatly
auded. Certainly, the current contribution and coverage are much
ower than the actual medical cost incurred. The reimbursement
ate is extremely low, only at 30% in many cases. It is extremely
ifficult to establish a well functioning healthcare insurance system
s witnessed by the current healthcare reform in the United States. A
ore pragmatic approach is needed, focusing on the most deprived
reas to begin with.
Rural education in China faces serious challenges. Among the
ost critical is that the current education system does not address
he needs of the vast number of migrant workers’ children. Although
ome migrant schools have been licensed and officially recognized
n recent years, migrant students still cannot take college entrance
xams in the province of their parents’ working place (Yao, 2009).
s a result, a majority of migrants leave their children behind with
randparents. Under this arrangement, local governments in lagging
egions bear a large share of the burden to educate the children of
igrant workers while their parents work and pay taxes in developed
egions. Because of more limited fiscal revenue, local governments
n lagging regions generally invest less on education on a per stu-
ent basis compared to their coastal counterparts. Meeting the cost
f meals and boarding remains a great challenge for many poor
amilies. The high boarding cost has been ranked as a key reason
or students dropping out of secondary schools. To combat the high
ost of boarding schools, a conditional cash transfer program in
oorer regions, similar to the Progresa (now Oportunidades) pro-
ram in Mexico, or a school feeding program similar to the “Food
or Education” (FFE) program in Bangladesh, could simultaneously
elp alleviate the farmers’ burden and improve children’s nutritional
tatus and educational attainment.
For many rural students graduating from secondary schools, the
ecision not to pursue higher education comes from the slim chance
m
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on the Chinese webpage (http://cn.chinagate.cn/society/2009-
f being admitted to college and the related prohibitive cost. The
overnment may also consider waiving the tuition fees for higher
ducation for students in rural areas and providing more scholarships
or children from poorer backgrounds.
.3. Governance reform
arge regional disparities may require, and may also hold out
pportunities for, governance reform. Because of China’s unique
overnance structure and intricate institutional texture, measures
elated to governance reform can be more heterodox and context
pecific. Therefore, the lessons learned in other countries are less
ransferable to China than infrastructure development and social
rograms. More local trial and error and experimentation are needed
n carrying out governance reform.
As discussed in the last section, fiscal decentralization has had
evere distributional consequences because local government size
nd structure are not tailored to reflect the revenue and popula-
ion base they represent. The conventional approaches to resolve
his problem are to cut government size in the lagging regions and
ncrease central fiscal transfers to these regions. In fact, Zhejiang
rovince has put all the counties under direct administration of
he provincial government from the very beginning of the fiscal
eform. As the most dynamic region in China, Zhejiang’s experi-
nce provides a demonstration effect for other provinces. In the past
everal years, Hubei Province has followed similar reforms. Under
irect administration, the county government has more discretionary
ower and fewer levels of government to deal with. Moreover, gov-
rnance innovations at the county level are more likely to spillover
o other counties in the same province instead of been limited only
o the prefecture level.
Since the implementation of the western development strat-
gy, the central government has increased its fiscal transfers to the
nland and rural regions. However, large transfers may also create
id dependency. For example, the counties with nationally desig-
ated poverty status enjoy much more transfers. As a result, they
o not have strong incentives to improve local investment environ-
ent to attract more private investment as other counties. Instead
hey turn their attention to seek more transfers from the upper level
overnment (Zhang, 2006).
Apart from the above traditional policies, China has also tried
any more heterodox policy measures. For example, the latest inno-
ations in land development rights transfers in the coastal provinces
nd the use of police officers from the same regions as local
igrants to fight crime in the coastal provinces show the feasibility
f overcoming the rigidity of governance structure through social
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entitlement exchanges (Luo and Zhang, 2009).5 Another example
is the pair-wise province-to-county aid strategy created by the cen-
tral government after the Sichuan earthquake in 2008. Each county
in the earthquake region was paired with an unaffected province,
usually in a more developed coastal region. The province took full
responsibility for the recovery and reconstruction in the designated
county. The province government in the coastal region was evaluated
based on their performance in terms of recovery and reconstruction
in their assigned corresponding county.
In the planning economy era, the evaluation of cadres was based
primarily on political performance. Since the economic reform
started in the late 1970s, political conformity has been replaced
by yardstick competition in key economic indicators and central
mandates, such as GDP growth rate, fiscal revenue growth rates,
and family planning (Li and Zhou, 2005). Since these indicators
have been written into local leaders’ contracts, the contents of
the contract influence the behavior of local offices. The impact of
a physical infrastructure can be easily observed right after it is
built while it takes a much longer time, often beyond the four-
year term of a county director or province governor, to witness
the lasting impact of a social investment. The central govern-
ment has adopted a reform to improve the evaluation indicators
for local officials. In some areas, the social indicators have been
included in cadres’ contracts in a bid to encourage them to care
more about social development. However, simply including more
social indicators may not work because of the challenges in mon-
itoring and evaluating social indicators. Recently, some regions
have tried to reward a county governor to stay in his post for
more than two terms at a higher pay scale. The purpose of longer
tenure is to align local cadres’ incentives with a more balanced
long-term development goal. In the meantime, some intermediate
outcomes or process variables can also be introduced, for exam-
ple, citizen report cards, spending on education and health, and
enrollment rates, to evaluate the annual performance of government
officials.
Overall, institutional reform and innovation is identified as a
key policy response to regional inequality. However, the particu-
lar reform measures can be heterodox and context specific. Some
experiments are already under way. We have suggested some more
in this section. Such an experimental approach, and learning from
the lessons of the Chinese experience, appears to us a more fruitful
route in this area than looking to other countries for experiences
with governance.
4. Conclusion: strategies, experience, and experimentsChina’s rapid economic growth in the past three decades has been
much discussed and celebrated. But this has not stopped the concern
on the growing regional inequality. Rising inequality may lead to
tensions within a country and compromise the prospect of long-
5 The conversion of land from agricultural to non-agricultural use is reg-
ulated by the central government through a permit system. Because of large
regional differences in economic development, the shadow price of land for
nonfarm use varies greatly across regions. This creates a space for exchang-
ing permits—the more developed regions purchase the land use permits from
the less development regions. These exchanges have occurred in China, in
particular within provinces in the coastal regions. For example, in 2002, the
capital city of Zhejiang Province, Hangzhou, purchased the development
rights of 3000 mu of lands, at a price of 60,000 RMB Yuan per mu, from
Haining City, a less developed region in Zhejiang Province.
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erm sustainable growth through a variety of social, political, and
conomic mechanisms (Kanbur and Lustig, 2000).
This study tries to unfold the driving forces behind the change
n regional inequality over the past six decades. The evolution
f inequality coincides with different phases of China’s eco-
omic development strategies. In particular, the heavy industry-led
evelopment strategy played a key role in forming the enormous
ural–urban gap in the planned economic era while openness
nd decentralization have contributed to the rapid increase in
nland–coastal disparity in the recent period.
The global financial crisis dried out the demand for China’s
xports and resulted in millions of workers losing their jobs. How-
ver, as recent Chinese history attests, crises often beget reforms.
he crisis provides a unique opportunity for the government to
ebalance its growth strategies, which it has already begun to do.
reviously, the central government has failed to put more invest-
ent into the rural and inland regions under its export-oriented and
rban-biased development strategy. But the recent stimulus package
s largely geared towards improving the inland economy by building
ong over-due infrastructure and setting up basic social safety nets in
he previously neglected rural and inland regions. Looking forward,
he current crisis may prove to be a turning point in rebalancing
hina’s regional disparities.
It is important to emphasize that, like many features of China
oday; regional disparities pose both challenges as well as oppor-
unities. The gains from further factor market reform may be
normous. Policies that facilitate the relocation of labor from low-
roductive sectors and regions to higher-productive counterparts
ould have a large payoff. A shift of capital investment from SOEs
nd cities to private firms and rural areas would help balance China’s
nvestment-driven growth model and boost citizens’ living stan-
ards. Strengthening financing mechanisms for private investment
n inland China also offers high pay offs to overall economic growth
nd regional inequality reduction.
Apart from factor market reform, we have considered three
ategories of instruments: infrastructure, social protection and
nvestment, and governance. On infrastructure, China has indeed
een engaged in significant activity over the past three decades and
specially in recent years. Investment in infrastructure to link coastal
nd interior regions and within lagging regions has a high pay-
ff in promoting economic growth in lagging regions and reducing
egional gaps. However, lessons are to be learnt from the Chinese
xperience on which types of infrastructure have the highest rates
f return in which specific regions.
The second category of instruments we consider fall broadly
nder the heading of social protection investment. There is a lively
ebate on these issues in China, but a perspective of regional inequal-
ty sheds new light on it. For example, the regional perspective
ighlights the importance of portability of social security benefits, to
ase migration and thus mitigate the buildup of regional inequalities.
he importance of building up human capital in the lagging regions
lso turns attention to some important international experience. In
ddition, providing education and health services for rural migrants
n urban centers is also essential to facilitate more migration. Over
he past two decades, social protection and social investment in many
ountries have converged in the shape of conditional cash transfers
argeted to building up the human capital of the poorest. This is an
rea in which China does not have much experience in recent his-
ory, and it is an area in which Chinese policy makers could indeed
earn from international experience in countries such as Brazil, Mex-
co, and India. However, because of large differences in context
rom other countries, China must adopt an experimental approach
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hen introducing these programs and redesign as lessons are
earnt.
Regarding governance reform, we argue that China should
ontinue to conduct its own experiments in governance reform, espe-
ially in light of the finding that provincial level decentralization has
ontributed to growing regional inequalities. Improvements in gov-
rnance at the county level and below in the lagging regions hold
ut greater promise. We have suggested a number of policy options,
uch as twinning of advanced and lagging counties to advance learn-
ng, and changing the contract of cadres in advanced and lagging
egions to better reflect social objectives in lagging regions. But
nce again, experimentation should be the mind set as these options
re introduced.
Pragmatism, trial and error, evidence-based policymaking, and
xperimentation with small-scale policy reforms that are later scaled
p, are all key features of China’s reforms. Most successful reforms
n China have experienced pilot experiments and impact evaluations
efore being scaled up.
Such experimentation has been particularly important in over-
oming several major obstacles to effective reform in China, related
o the country’s size, its diversity, and the history and structure of
ts hierarchical political system. For a large and diverse economy
ike China, it is very difficult to derive a single one-size-fits-all
lueprint for reform simply by applying textbook economic the-
ries. Instead, trial and error processes can help discover local best
ractices. At the same time, the large regional differences imply
pportunities for institutional and policy experimentation. The par-
icular reform measures can be heterodox and context specific. Most
f the reform measures which have turned out to be so successful
n the past several decades originated from within provinces and
ownships and followed the spirit of experimentation before being
caled up.
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